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The relationship between dialectics and rhetoric, as Professor Krabbe rightly reminds us,
goes back to the Greeks: Plato wished to rend them asunder in his dialogue, Gorgias, and
Aristotle sought their reconciliation, or at least hinted at the possibility of their productive and
peaceful co-habitation, in his Rhetoric. Since the Greeks, nearly everyone interested in the
theory of argumentation has had a hand at trying either to say what Aristotle really thought the
difference was between dialectics and rhetoric, or else at claiming to have found the real
difference. The dialectic – or should I perhaps say, ‘the rhetoric’ or ‘the dialectic and the
rhetoric’ – continues. At one point in their recent work on integrating rhetorical insights into
their dialectical model, Van Eemeren and Houtlosser say:
To overcome the sharp and infertile ideological division between rhetoric and dialectic,
we view dialectic as a theory of argumentation in natural discourse, fitting rhetorical
1
insight ... [of] ... persuasion techniques into this theoretical framework. (165)

The view here is that the pragma-dialectical theory is a theory of argumentation in natural
discourse and rhetoric is not, but it can be fitted to the pragma-dialectical theory, and in doing
this “the sharp and infertile division between rhetoric and dialectic” is overcome. Whether this
marriage is a natural and fitting one between star-crossed lovers, or an arranged one designed to
protect the family fortune, is an interesting question.
Rhetoric through pragma-dialectical eyes
We should look carefully at how rhetoric is viewed through pragma-dialectical eyes. She is,
of course, contrasted with dialectics.
It is said that there are dialectical norms and that people who have the goal of solving their
differences in a rational manner have an eye on these norms, at least imperfectly and implicitly.
One goal of those who argue with each other, then, is that their arguing should be done in accord
with a set of rules which will allow the best argument to carry the day. Still, one may also hope
that things turn out in one’s own favour; thus, without violating any of the dialectical rules that
the arguers have agreed to, each may engage in certain strategies that he hopes will improve his
chances of having the argumentation turn out to his advantage. These strategies, identified as
falling into one or another of three categories, Van Eemeren and Houtlosser call “rhetorical
aspects of argumentation.”
There are two points to notice here: (i) availing oneself of rhetorical strategies is not
inconsistent with engaging in a critical discussion (with being dialectical), and (ii) the dialectical
theory comes first and rhetoric is an ‘add-on’ aspect of argumentative discourse.

1

In another essay van Eemeren and Houtlosser put it this way: “To overcome the sharp and infertile
ideological division between rhetoric and dialectic, we view dialectic -- in line with Agricola -- as a theory of
argumentation in natural discourse, and fit rhetorical insights into our dialectical framework.” (1999b: 479-97).
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**************************
A short aside for which we will not have time ...
Just as Van Eemeren and Houtlosser are now worrying the relationship between dialectics
and rhetoric, logicians have also taken up the question of the relation between logic and rhetoric
and have, in the main, put rhetoric in the weaker position. There is logic, and logic is good; there
is also rhetoric, and it is not logic. Susan Stebbing thought logic and rhetoric had naught to do
with one another.
Rhetoric is a means of persuasion. The aim of the orator is to induce belief, not to
demonstrate a conclusion; his art consists in persuading others to accept a conclusion for
which there is no adequate evidence. ... the orator substitutes persuasion for conviction.,
appealing to emotion rather than to conviction. The speech of a great orator is a work of
art; as such it has nothing to do with logic. (Stebbing 1950: 468)

Irving Copi also briefly compares logic and rhetoric in his famous book, Introduction to
Logic.
... other methods are available which may resolve a disagreement in attitude. Persuasion
may be attempted, with its extensive use of expressive discourse. Rhetoric may be of
paramount utility in unifying the will of a group, in achieving unanimity of attitude. But
of course it is wholly worthless in resolving a question of fact. (Copi 1962: 43)

Logic is good for resolving questions of fact, and rhetoric is not. This division once made
between logic and rhetoric is analogous to the one made by those who want to distinguish
dialectics from rhetoric, but it is being done in a post-positivist era when we are less hostile to
the art of rhetoric.
*****************************
That the fist will fit into the open hand is not a new idea. The Pragma-Dialecticians know
that they are taking up an ancient theme when they say that dialectics and rhetoric should work
together. Moreover – taking a hint from Agricola (the common ancestor of Coca Cola and
Pepsicola) – Pragma-Dialectics wants to drape the tapestry of rhetoric on the naked scaffolding
of dialectical theory. This we should have anticipated. But that rhetorical manoeuvres have
been classified into three kinds seems to me very useful, and it leads to what I think is novel and
ingenious, namely that Pragma-Dialectics proposes to explore the possible rhetorical manoeuvres
at each stage of argumentation calling for a strategy.
The lay of argumentative discourse making room for both dialectics and rhetoric might be
this:
AD is a piece of argumentative discourse only if
1) A and B perceive a difference of opinion X, i.e., A holds that O and B knows it,
and either B holds that not-O and A knows it, or, B doubts that O, and A knows it
2) A has the goal, Ga, of reaching a rational resolution to X by means of a
dialectical discussion
3) B has the goal, Gb, of reaching a rational resolution of X by means of a
dialectical discussion
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4) The realization of Ga = the realization of Gb
5) A has a goal, Ra, that the discussion should be decided in A’s favour
6) B has a goal, Rb, that the discussion should be decided in B’s favour
7) It is not possible that both Ra and Rb are realized
(We might say that people who engage in argumentative discourse have ‘mixed feelings’
about doing so.)
The model as I have presented it, does not show that there is any relation between the goals
that a participant may have (e.g., between Ra and Ga). But Krabbe points out what seems to me
to be true, namely, that the goals can be “functionally related, as means to ends,” and he goes
further, saying that the attempt to meet one’s own goals in dialogue actually serves the purpose
of trying to reach a common goal. If Van Eemeren and Houtlosser shared Krabbe’s insight here
about how some goals are subservient to other goals, then, they might say that the rhetorical
goals are in the service of the dialectical goals. I wonder, however, is there some reason why the
dialectical goals couldn’t be secondary to the rhetorical ones? Krabbe’s example of a negotiation
dialogue seems to be a case in point: each side hopes to advance its interest through adhering to
the rules of that kind of dialogue: but each person’s overall aim is not simply to get a
compromise (the goal of the dialogue) but to get a compromise with a content which is an
improvement on their initial position (a self-interested goal). And I think that the same could
occur in a critical discussion. My first goal is to win, and my second one is to do it by the rules
of critical discussion. If I see that I can easily, and by the dialectical rules, send my opponent
packing, why couldn’t my goals be related that way?
Krabbe and the wide sense of ‘dialectics’
Krabbe’s point of departure from the Van Eemeren and Houtlosser’s account is prompted by
a disagreement about what is to count as dialectical and rhetorical behaviour respectively.
Krabbe starts by saying that for behaviour to be dialectically reasonable it must conform to the
rules of the model, but this is not enough.
If we want to use model M as a model of fully reasonable discussion, we should ask more
of both discussants than that they neatly conform to the rules of M. ... [They] ... should
also put an effort into the discussion. ... The requirement of putting an effort into the
discussion is part and parcel of the concept of reasonableness that is articulated in the
model. (Krabbe 2001)

Accordingly, Krabbe formulates a second dialectical requirement (a requirement on those
engaged in dialectics) that they should try to win.
The second requirement stresses the competitive nature of critical discussion. But
ultimately this competitive character is meant to serve the common goal of reaching the
best possible result. Competition is an integrated part of the explication of the concept of
“reasonable discussion,” and therefore of the concept of “reasonable argument.” For that
reason, strategic behaviour, within the bounds of ... [the rules of the model], ... aimed at
winning the discussion is most properly regarded as dialectical. To call such behaviour
rhetorical seems off the mark (Krabbe 2001).

Armed with this insight, Krabbe thinks the reach of dialectically reasonable and strategic
behaviour is wider than was imagined by Van Eemeren and Houtlosser. For example, whereas
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they are inclined to classify the selection of topical material (arguments), and the exploitation of
the audience’s disposition as rhetorical manoeuvres, Krabbe sees that these moves may be done
in accord with the dialectical responsibility of trying to win a critical discussion, and hence that
they may be classified as dialectical behaviour.
Krabbe also goes on to argue that Van Eemeren and Houtlosser’s third level of rhetorical
manoeuvring – that which involves the use of presentational devices – may well consist in
behaviour that is merely consistent with a dialectical rule about language use (be clear, avoid
ambiguity, etc.). Therefore, such apparently rhetorical manoeuvring turns out on closer
inspection to be required by the dialectical model, and so there is reason to classify it as
dialectical behaviour rather than rhetorical behaviour.
But notice the assumption with which we have been keeping company. The rules of the
model, are dialectical rules. But what makes them so? Is it analytically so? Is it written at the
top of the page?
The famous Rule 10 of Pragma-Dialectics is a rule which we may well wonder about.
Would not a rhetor, someone bent on persuasion, who wanted to be clearly and unambiguously
understood by his partner-in-dialogue be compelled to follow just this rule?
A party must not use formulations that are insufficiently clear, or confusingly ambiguous,
and he must interpret the other party’s formulations as carefully and accurately as
possible (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992: 196).2

This seems on the face of it to be a rule about the standard of communication in
argumentative discourse, a standard which is perhaps essential to getting your dialectical point
successfully conveyed. But that does not mean that it is a dialectical rule, i.e., a rule of
dialectics. Thus one can reason opposite to Krabbe, and say that because some behaviour
required by Rule 10 is rhetorical in nature, it follows that Rule 10 is not a pure dialectical rule.
Discussion
How then are we to view the relation between dialectics and rhetoric? Krabbe says, “... if it
can be sustained ... [a] characterization of the difference between dialectical and rhetorical
behaviour will always be relative to some more or less articulated model of dialogue” (Krabbe
2001). This means that it is only in relation to a model of dialogue that we can say what’s
dialectical and what’s rhetorical. What is the model like that it allows us to do this?
The illusive model M remains undefined in this discussion. It is supposed to be a model of
fully reasonable discussion, a model of dialogue, a model of discussion, and it has rules.
Compliance with the rules of M, whatever it is, is the first and fundamental dialectical obligation.
Krabbe is inclined to think that there may be more than one M, and the points he wants to make
about dialectical and rhetorical behaviour, he takes to be general points that will be true no
matter what the details of M are. And the general point is this:
In as far as various choices and moves can be analysed in terms of trying to make a move
in M, they are properly subsumed under the concept of dialectical behaviour, whereas
other aspects of behaviour, that are analysed from some other perspective than trying to

2

Actually, there seems to be three rules here.
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make a move in M, may, in a number of cases, be properly called rhetorical (Krabbe
2001).

I don’t disagree at all that there are essential differences between the heart of dialectics and
the heart of rhetoric, and that to understand one is to be able to contrast it with the other. I have
reservations, however, about a program which, without hesitation, gives pride of place to
dialectics in argumentative discourse. This treats rhetoric as an ‘add-on’, something extraneous
to the normative centre of a dialogue-model, and I think it underestimates the importance of
rhetoric/communication in argumentative discourse. Hence, I’m inclined to resist Professor
Krabbe’s expansionist moves on behalf of dialectics; I might even want a narrower conception of
dialectics than the one being advanced by Van Eemeren and Houtlosser.
The rules of dialectics and the rules of argumentative discourse are not quite the same thing.
Similarly, dialectical models and models of dialogue are not identical either. I’m not sure that
everyone appreciates this. For example, some “view dialectic as a theory of argumentation in
natural discourse” (Van Eemeren and Houtlosser 1999a). Rule 10, which we just considered,
seems a good rule of argumentative discourse, but it is an anomaly as a dialectical requirement
unless ‘dialectic’ is taken as synonymous with ‘theory of argumentation in natural discourse.’ A
model of dialogue should embody some dialectical ideals but it also has to include other
components, and saying these are all dialectical components because they are part of the model,
amounts to an attempt to rearrange the furniture.
Dialectics and rhetoric are both part of argumentative discourse; argumentative discourse
may be modelled in a model of dialogue, and therefore a model of dialogue should not be one
that excludes rhetorical requirements. It turns out then that I agree with Professor Krabbe’s point
that the relation between dialectics and rhetoric must be understood in relation to a model. But I
think it must be the kind of model which integrates dialectical and rhetorical aspects of
argumentative discourse.
Recently, Ralph Johnson wrote a book in which he wants to develop a theory of argument,
and he clearly holds that his theory is not a rhetorical theory. In fact, he sees an important
difference between his approach and what he takes to be the rhetorical approach to argument
(Johnson 2000: 163). But one of the most important requirements of arguing, for Johnson, is that
the rationality of the arguer should be made manifest; that is, it should be clear and unmistakable
-- transparent, if you like. But why? So that the one who is being persuaded will see the details
of the case exactly as they are, in terms of strength, relevance, and in face of the objections.
Ironically, this seems to me to be a rhetorical requirement ... it is done for the sake of the Other,
the persuadee, the audience, whatever .... Surely, an argument would not be less rational if for
some reason it was not fully understood, or misunderstood, by the other, even though that would
make it an inefficient instrument of persuasion. Rational persuasion, then, makes rhetorical
demands. So too, I think, do models of argumentative discourse.
This gives me a chance to add my own answer to the old question, “What is the difference
between dialectics and rhetoric?”: Dialectics has to do with reasonableness in discourse, rhetoric
with reasonableness of discourse. As an illustration, take the good argument that is not well
communicated. It may well be a reasonable argument (its reasonableness can be found in the
discourse), but if it is presented to an audience which is not prepared to receive it, or unable to do
so, then the use of the discourse fails to be reasonable.
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The model of argumentative discourse we are looking for is one which integrates rationality
both in and of discourse (and perhaps other considerations too). So, I agree with Professor
Krabbe, and Van Eemeren and Houtlosser that the marriage of dialectics and rhetoric is
imminent. I am not yet persuaded, however, of the terms they propose to put in the pre-nuptial
agreement.
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